Check an agent receipt against a deliberately tampered copy
At a glance
CIRCE's maker demonstrated offline verification of a signed agent-action receipt and rejection of a one-field mutation. This workflow is listed under Agent Tooling, Verification, Audit Trails.
- Agents / tools
- CIRCE, Python, cryptography
SourceBuilding a tool for these workflows? See weekly rates.
What they did
1) Install Python 3.9 or later and download the wv26296-ux/circe-receipts repository, including verify_receipt.py, both sample receipt JSON files, and requirements.txt. 2) In the repository folder, create a virtual environment with `python3 -m venv .venv`, activate it with `source .venv/bin/activate` on macOS or Linux, and run `pip install -r requirements.txt`. Installation needs network access; verification does not. 3) Run `python3 verify_receipt.py hn_receipt.json` and inspect the ok, signature_ok, and public_hash_ok values. 4) Run `python3 verify_receipt.py hn_receipt_tampered.json` to test the copy with a changed signed field. Finish by comparing the verification results for the two artifacts.
How it went
The published example expects all three checks to pass for the original and overall verification to fail for the altered receipt.
Worth knowing
Only signed_block is covered. The maker notes that a valid signature cannot establish whether an issuer's claims are true.
